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Articles
The Supreme Court's 1987-88 Term:
Implications for the Transnational
Practitioner

J. Clark Kelso*
This article is the first in a continuing series that will be published
in the TransnationalLawyer analyzing the transnational implications
of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. Because of
the world-wide importance of American law to the transnational
practitioner, and because of the importance in American law of
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, the editors
believe that it is appropriate to reserve space in the journal for a
review of the Court's work during the preceding year.
In this first installment, I review two jurisdiction-related decisions,
a gray market goods case, and two immigration and naturalization
cases. Although virtually any decision by the Supreme Court may
have implications for the transnational practitioner, the five decisions
selected for this issue appear to have the greatest potential for direct
impact on transnational lawyers.'
* Assistant Professor of Law; University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
I. The term "transnational law" was employed by Philip Jessup in 1956 to describe all
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Since that time, the

scope of the term has narrowed to merely the laws that govern international business
transactions. MARK W. JAMs, INTRODUCTiON TO INTEmrAioNAL LAW 200 (1988). Perhaps the
more apt approach is to define transnational law as the study of legal transactions between
the nationals of two or more states. Doland, Book Review, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 500 n.2
(1988).
The Court's decision in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104

(1988), concerning the Hague Service Convention will be the subject of a student article in the
next issue of The TransnationalLawyer and is not discussed in this article.
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I.
A.

ExEcuTrvE Su

Y OF CASES

JurisdictionCases

In Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,2 the Court unanimously held
that dismissal of a case from a federal district court on forum non
conveniens grounds did not necessarily prevent the losing plaintiff
from bringing the same suit in state court since the state court might
apply different standards to the determination of whether the forum
was inconvenient.3 Once a state court action is filed, the issue of
whether the federal forum non conveniens rules preempted the state
rules must generally be litigated in state court. 4 On that basis, the
Court held that the federal district court does not have jurisdiction
to enjoin the state court action. 5 The practical result is that a foreign
defendant may find itself subject to suit in state court after it has
already obtained a dismissal in federal court on forum non conveniens
grounds.
In Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd.,6 the
Court unanimously held that a federal district court could not imply
a service of process provision into the Commodity Exchange Act and
that service of process could therefore be had only in accord with
the state long-arm statute. 7 The case is important apart from the
Commodity Exchange Act because the Court appears to lay down a
broad, black-letter rule that if a federal statute does not contain an
explicit service of process provision, a federal court may not imply
such a provision, and service must then comply with state law.
B.

Commercial and Business Law

In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,8 a sharply divided Court
all but one of the Customs Service regulations that permit
gray market goods (i.e., goods that have imprinted on them
trademark) to be imported into the United States without the
2.
3.
4.
5.

upheld
certain
a U.S.
written

Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988) (O'Connor, J.).
Id. at 1690-91.
Id. at 1691.
Id.

6. Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1988)
(Blackmun, J.).
7.

Id. at 413.

8. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
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consent of the trademark holder. The decision is a boon to discount
shoppers since gray market goods are always cheaper (sometimes as

much as 20 to 40 percent cheaper) than the authorized imports. 9

Removing the uncertainty surrounding the legality of the gray market
imports is sure to increase the size of the already multi-billion dollar
gray market industry.
C. Immigration and Naturalization
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Abudu, 0 the Court
held that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals not to reopen a
deportation proceeding on the basis of newly discovered evidence."
The case is a good example of the Court granting special deference
to the Board of Immigration Appeals because of the political and
foreign policy implications of deportation proceedings.
-In Kungys v. United States,'2 the Court held that a misrepresentation in the course of naturalization proceedings is "material" only
' 3
if it has "a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS.'
In so holding, the Court rejected a more specific test that it had
propounded almost thirty years ago. 4 There was no majority opinion,
however, and it is unclear how the new materiality definition should
be applied. The Court thus seems to have created more confusion in
an already perplexing area of law.
II.

THE JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS

One of the most important legal questions that a non-American
business must face in its planning is whether its activities will .be
subject to United States law in a United States courtroom. The sheer
expense of litigating in the United States is certainly an important

9. Justice Kennedy, the author of the key opinion in K Mart, reportedly quipped that
his colleagues on the Court now call out as he walks down the. hall "Attention K-Mart
Shoppers," a reference to K-Mart promotional advertisements. San Fiancisco Recorder, June
13, 1988, at 9.
10. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988).
11. Id. at 907.

12. Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
13.

Id. at 1547.

14. In Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960), the Court had defined a
"material fact" under the statute as one which, "if known, would have warranted denial of
citizenship" or which "might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id.
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consideration for any business (including U.S. companies). 5 Perhaps
more important, however, is the possible application of United States

law to the conduct of non-U.S. businesses. The law of the United
States may impose stricter obligations upon foreign businesses than

does the law of the homeland of the business. If a United States
court asserts jurisdiction over a case, that naturally increases the

6
likelihood that U.S. law will apply.'
Given the importance for planning purposes of knowing whether
a United States court will extend its jurisdiction over a non-U.S.
business, it would be a happy task to report that United States courts

have adopted a uniform, simple test that a non-U.S. business could
use to predict the risk of being required to litigate in the United

States. Sadly, the Supreme Court of the United States has done little
to clarify the jurisdictional reach of United States courts with respect
to a foreign defendant. The constitutional limits of jurisdiction are

marked by the "minimum contacts" test

7

and, if the minimum

contacts.test is satisfied, by "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.""' Both tests find their origin in International

Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 the Supreme Court's leading modern case
on personal jurisdiction. Both tests involve a balancing of factors,
making predictability and application in specific cases difficult.2 0

15. "It is a sad commentary on the effectiveness of the law on both the national and
international levels that it took two years and the expenditure of over $25 million in legal
costs alone simply to identify the proper forum for suits arising out of the [Bhopal] disaster."
McCaffrey, Accidents Do Happen: Hazardous Technology and International Tort Litigation,
1 TRANSNAr'L LAW. 41, 41-42 (1988) (footnote omitted).
16. A court is more likely to apply its own law rather than foreign law because it is more
familiar with the law of the forum. A court thus may have an interest in applying forum law
irrespective of the controversy before the court. See Strassberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 575 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting the preference under California choice-oflaw rules for applying forum law). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNaicT oF LAWS § 6
comment e (1969). The only constitutional limit on the application of forum law, is that the
forum must have a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" which creates
"state interests" such that application of forum law is not arbitrary or unfair. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1953); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
18. InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
19. Id.
20.

The newly-published RE TATEmENT (IHam) OF TnE FOREION RELATONs LAW OF TnE

UNrrED STATEs § 421 (1987) does not clearly set forth these two tests. Instead, the Section
provides in subsection (1) that jurisdiction exists "if the relationship of the state to the person
or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable," and provides in subsection
(2) a list of situation-types in which jurisdiction is reasonable:
(a) the person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other than transitorily;
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The Court's failure to clarify its jurisdictional rules has in large
part been a result of its inward-looking perspective. In the past,

jurisdictional questions have arisen most frequently in an inter-state
rather than an international context. 21 In the inter-state context, the
Court has stressed the importance of federalism, thereby giving
recognition to the sovereign status of each state in the United States.22
Possibly because of the Court's narrow views of federalism underlying
U.S. jurisdictional doctrines, coupled with the absence of international cases that directly trigger the "minimum contacts" and the
"fair play and substantial justice" tests, the Court has failed to
define the scope of these tests in international settings.?
However, the Court attempted to resolve some of these problems
in the 1986-87 Term in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court

(b) the person, if a natural person, is domiciled in the state; (c) the person, if a
natural person, is resident in the state; (d) the person, if a natural person, is a
national of the state; (e) the person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person,
is organized pursuant to the law of the state; (f) a ship, aircraft or other vehicle to
which the adjudication relates is registered under the laws of the state; (g) the
person, whether natural or juridical, has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, has regularly carded on business in the
state; (i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activity in the
state, but only in respect of such activity; (j) the person, whether natural or juridical, 4"
had carried on outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect within the state, but only in respect of such activity; or (k) the
thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, possessed, or used in the state,
but only in respect of a claim reasonably connected with that thing.
REMATEMENT (TRnnD) OF TIM FO EIMN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTrED STATES § 421(1), (2)
(1987). This list is somewhat more helpful than the Supreme Court's two tests, although in
close cases, a practitioner must of course parse the Supreme Court's language and not the
Restatement language.
21. For example, the leading case on personal jurisdiction, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, involved a Delaware corporation sued in the State of Washington. 326 U.S. 310
(1945). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (Florida corporation
sued by Michigan resident); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(New York corporations sued by driver who was in an automobile accident in Oklahoma);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (trust agreement executed in Deleware between
Delaware corporation and Pennsylvania domiciliary who later moved to Florida); McGee v.
Internat'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (Texas insurance company and California resident).
But see Helicopteros Nacionalos de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (finding insufficient
contacts to justify assertion of jurisdiction by Texas courts over Columbian corporation.
22. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (Black, J.,
concurring).
23. The Court's jurisdictional rules have worked tolerably well in the United States because
we are well experienced with our own federal system. A foreign practitioner, however, may
be surprised at the implications of our federal structure, and the federalism-based rules may
not work so well in an international context. For example, in a suit by a California or New
York resident against a German corporation, the federalism concerns that are present in an
inter-state litigation seem less appropriate and are surely of less importance. It also must be
of concern and wonder to a foreign practitioner that a client may find itself subject to the
varying laws of more than fifty state jurisdictions.
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of California.24 In Asahi, the Court considered whether a California
state court had personal jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer
of component parts who had been sued for indemnification by a
Taiwanese manufacturer based upon a transaction that took place in
Taiwan. 25 The component part manufacturer made valves for motorcycle tire tubes which were sold to the Taiwanese manufacturer of
the tubes. The underlying action was brought in California by the
victim of a motorcycle accident. Following a settlement between the
plaintiff and the primary defendants, the only claim remaining was
the indemnification claim by the Taiwanese manufacturer against the
Japanese manufacturer. 26
A majority of the Court in Asahi held that assertion of jurisdiction
over the Japanese component part manufacturer in these circumstances would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ,,27 Refreshingly, the Court applied this test in Asahi with a

keen eye on the transnational implications of extending jurisdiction
beyond U.S. borders. Thus, in considering the burden placed upon
the defendant, the Court noted that: "Itihe unique burdens placed
upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching
2
the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders."
The Court also instructed that in balancing the interests of the
possible forums "a court [must] consider the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
assertion of jurisdiction by the California court."2 More generally,
the Court cautioned that "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field." 30
Although a majority of the Court was clearly sensitive to transnational concerns when it came to application of the "fair play and

24. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987).
25. The component part manufacturer, Asahi Metal Industry Co. (a Japanese corporation),
entered into an agreement with, and sold to, Cheng Shin (a Taiwanese corporation), valve
stems to be used in finished tire tubes. The sales to Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan. The
shipments from Asahi to Cheng Shin were sent from Japan to Taiwan where they were redistributed by Cheng Shin. Id. at 1029-30.
26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 107 S.Ct. 1026 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316 (1945)).

28. Id. at 1034.
29. Asahi, 107 S.Ct. at 1034 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 1035 (quoting United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404
(1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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substantial justice" test, the Court was more fractured in its approach

to the "minimum contacts" test. A plurality of justices (O'Connor,
Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia) thought that the minimum contacts
test was also not satisfied because the Japanese component part
manufacturer did nothing "to purposefully avail itself of the Cali-

fornia market." ' 31 Rather, the component part manufacturer did
' 32
nothing more than place the product "into the stream of commerce
which, according to this plurality, was "not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State. ' 33 This view surely
reflects an appreciation that the interconnectedness of international
markets does not equate with worldwide jurisdiction for United States
courts.
But Justice O'Connor's opinion concerning the "minimum con-

tacts" test was only a plurality. Four other justices (Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun) argued that the minimum contafcts test is
satisfied when a foreign defendant puts a product into the stream of
commerce with knowledge "that the final product is being marketed
in the forum State. ' 34 According to these justices, the manufacturer's
"regular and extensive sales of component parts to a manufacturer
it knew was making regular sales of the final product in California
is [sufficient to establish minimum contacts with California." '3 - Although this "stream of commerce" theory is certainly favored by a
majority of United States courts and commentators, 36 it is surely a
cause of concern for transnational businesses.
The ninth justice to vote in Asahi, Justice Stevens, did not join
Justice O'Connor's opinion because he believed that even under the
"purposeful availment" test, the requisite minimum contacts existed. 37 Justice Stevens explained that, in his view, "a regular course
of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually
over a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful availment'
even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard
product marketed throughout the world. ' 38 Resolution of this battle

31.

Id. at 1033.

32. Defined in Justice Brennan's opinion as "the regular and anticipated flow of products
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale." Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
33. Id. at 1033.
34.
35.

Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 1037-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).

36. See the list of authorities cited in Asahi, 107 S.Ct. at 1036 nn.1, 2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part).
37. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
38. Id.
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between the "stream of commerce" theory and the "purposeful
availment" theory must await future cases, and because Justice
Kennedy replaced Justice Powell (who voted in Asahi in favor of
the "purposeful availment" application), predicting how the Court
will resolve the debate is virtually impossible.
In its 1987-88 Term, the Court heard two jurisdiction related cases.
In Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,39 the Court applied its rather
wooden interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act to require a defendant who had already won a dismissal in federal court in Texas on
forum non conveniens grounds to relitigate the same issue in a Texas
state court. Although the result in Chick Kam Choo is arguably
correct as a matter of federalism, it appears to be a step backward
from the Court's more internationalist (and less federalist) perspective
in Asahi.
Chick Kam Choo involved the death of a Singapore resident in
Singapore. The plaintiff (also a resident of Singapore) filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
against Exxon Corp. (which has its headquarters in Houston, Texas)
alleging claims under both federal law and Texas state law for the
death of her husband.4 The district court dismissed the federal claims
on a motion for summary judgment, 41 and dismissed the state claim
for forum non conveniens.42 As part of its forum non conveniens
analysis, the district court held that Singapore law, and not Texas
law, applied to all claims. 43 The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
all claims.44
Faced with this defeat, the plaintiff-obviously eager to maintain
the action before a Texas jury that might be more receptive and
sympathetic to the plaintiff and, if liability were found, would
possibly award higher damages than a Singapore jury-filed the same

39. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988).
40. The federal claims were under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1982 & Supp. Ill
1985); and the general maritime law of the United States. The state action was based on the
Texas Wrongful Death Statutes, Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CoDE ANN. (Vernon) §§ 71.00171.031 (1986). Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1687.
41. The Jones Act was held inapplicable since the decedent was not a seaman. The Death
on the High Seas Act was held inapplicable since the death occurred while the ship was in
port (rather than on the high seas). The general maritime law of the United States was held

inapplicable under a choice-of-law analysis. Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1687-88.
42. Id. at 1688.
43.

Id.

44. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
826 (1983).
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complaint plus a claim under Singapore law in a Texas state court. 45
Apparently realizing that the existence of the federal claims in the
complaint made removal to the Texas federal court a likely possibility,46 the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the federal claims, leaving
a claim under Texas law and a claim under Singapore law. 47 The
the case to federal court
defendant's attempt subsequently to remove
45
failed for lack of complete diversity.
The defendant, hoping to avoid litigation in a Texas state court,
filed an action in federal court to enjoin the state suit.49 The federal
action was a calculated risk. As a general matter, the Anti-Injunction
Act prohibits a federal court from enjoining a state court proceeding.50 Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act has long been regarded by
the Supreme Court as one of the bulwarks of our federal system in
which both federal and state courts must operate contemporaneously. 51 Although the Anti-Injunction Act puts state courts on the
same level as federal courts for some purposes-" [d]ue in no small
part to the fundamental constitutional independence of the States"5the supremacy of federal law suggests that there may be some
circumstances in which a federal court can enjoin the action of a
state court.53 The Anti-Injunction Act provides for three such exceptions: (1) "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress"; (2) "where
necessary in aid'54of its jurisdiction"; and (3) "to protect or effectuate
its judgments."
The third exception-often called the "relitigation exception"-was the only ground arguably applicable in Chick Kam Choo. The
defendant argued that, having litigated and lost the forum non

45.

Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1688.

46. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441 (Law. Co-op 1988).
47.
48.
49.
50.

Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1688.
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985).
Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1688.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an

injunction to stay proceedings in a State Court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
Id.

51. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1689; Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 107 S.
Ct. 1519, 1524 (1987); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1977) (plurality

opinion); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970).
52. Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1689.
53. As a theoretical matter, it would be possible to have a system in which a lower federal

court could never enjoin a state proceeding and where the only relief from improper state
court action would be an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Such a system

in the United States would be unworkable as a practical matter given the large size of our
judicial system and the relatively small resources available to the Supreme Court.
54.

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
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conveniens issue in Texas federal court, the plaintiff should not be
permitted to relitigate that issue in a Texas state court 5 The Fifth
Circuit agreed, despite an argument that the Texas rule on forum
non conveniens was significantly more generous to the plaintiff than
the federal rule.56 The Fifth Circuit avoided the potentially conflicting
Texas law by holding that, in a maritime context, the federal forum
non conveniens rule preempted any contrary state rule, under the socalled "reverse-Erie" doctrine s7 Since the federal rule preempted any
contrary Texas rule, the Fifth Circuit held that the prior federal
determination that Texas was not a convenient forum was binding
on the state court and could not be relitigated in that court.
The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, with
only Justice White concurring separately. The Court held that the
injunction was proper with respect to the Texas state claim since the
federal district court had held in the prior suit that Singapore law,
not Texas law, applied. 5 But the Court held that the injunction
against prosecution of the Singapore claim was barred by the AntiInjunction Act. 9
The Court's reasoning with respect to the Singapore claim demonstrates that its formal and narrow federalism rules will at times
win out over competing considerations of efficiency and fairness.
The key to the Court's holding is found in what the Court itself
described as a "strict and narrow"

rule that ".

.

. an essential

prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that the claims
or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation in
' 60
state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court.
According to the Court, the federal court in the first lawsuit
decided only that, applying federal forum non conveniens principles,
55. Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1691.
56. The majority noted that, in light of the Texas "open courts" provision, TEx. CoNsr.,
Art. I, § 13 (which is incorporated into the Texas Wrongful Death Statutes, TEX. Crv. PRAc.
& RmA. CoDE ANH. § 71.031 (1986)), it may be that "Texas has constituted itself the world's
forum of final resort; where suit for personal injury or death may always be filed if nowhere
else." Chick Karn Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1688-89 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817
F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 1987)) (footnote omitted).
57. Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1689. Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court is
ordinarily required to apply state substantive law except in matters governed by the Constitution
or acts of Congress. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In maritime matters,
however, the "reverse-Erie" doctrine provides that state courts are required to apply federal
maritime law. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986) (when
respondents' husbands were killed in a helicopter crash off the coast of Louisiana, federal
maritime law was clearly intended to control).
58. Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1691-92.
59. Id. at 1691.
60. Id. at 1690 (emphasis added).
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the Texas federal court was not an appropriate forum to litigate the
Singapore claim.61 The federal court did not decide under state law
that Texas was an inconvenient forum, a result that might be different
under Texas' more liberal rules. The Court then resolved the remaining preemption argument (that is, that federal forum non conveniens law preempted inconsistent state law), by holding that since
the preemption question was not itself litigated in the first lawsuit,
litigation of that question in the second federal suit did not fall
within the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.2 Accordingly, that portion of the injunction directed against the Singapore claim was invalid, thus requiring Exxon to defend against that
claim in state court.
The Court's interpretation of the relitigation exception is certainly,
as the Court itself admits, "strict and narrow." It is, in this writer's
view, unnecessary and unreasonable. The Court's holding is a reaction
to the possibility of federal court injunctions against "state court
proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade an area pre-empted by federal law." 63
Yet the injunction in Chick Kam Choo was based not merely upon
state court interference with a federal right or invasion of an area
preempted by federal law. Rather it was based upon interference
with a federal right that had been judicially declared to exist: a right
to avoid a lawsuit in Texas. That the first federal court did not utter
in the same breath "and the federal rule preempts Texas law" is not
a particularly good reason for permitting a state action to go forward
if, as a matter of law, the federal rule prevails. There is no good
reason why that legal question should not be resolved by the federal
64
court as it acts "to protect or effectuate its judgments."
In defense of the Court's holding, it can be argued that since the
Texas courts are presumed to be competent to decide federal issues
(such as preemption) and since the Supreme Court has'the power to
review any incorrect state court determinations of federal issues, it
does not significantly harm a litigant to be forced to litigate in a
Texas'state court once there. It is, however, a supreme irony from
the Supreme Court that it cited in support of this reasoning Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,6S a case in which the Texas state courts'
.61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 1691.
Chick Kam Choo, 108 S. Ct. at 1691.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
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competence to deal with federal issues was questionable at best."
Moreover, the Court's decision leaves the practitioner in a no-win
situation. The preemption question (whether federal forum non conveniens rules preempt state law) will not be ripe for resolution in the
first federal suit since, in the absence of an on-going state suit, the
federal court will have no reason to consider the issue. But, by the
time the plaintiff has discovered a new cause of action and filed suit
in state court (which might be more hospitable to the plaintiff's
claims), the Anti-Injunction Act will prevent litigation of the issue
in federal court. The peculiar result of the Court's reasoning is that,
with some degree of foresight, a plaintiff's lawyer can keep the
federal issue of whether federal forum non conveniens rules preempt
state rules from being litigated in a federal court other than the
Supreme Court on appeal from a state court judgment.
For a foreign defendant (unlike Exxon Corp., the defendant in
Chick Kam Choo), the hardship of the Court's ruling is even more
apparent. Forced to bear the burdens of litigating in a federal court
which has been judicially determined to be an inconvenient forum,
the foreign litigant must be prepared to face another suit in state
court which may be located across the street from the federal court
and will surely be equally inconvenient. Hopefully, if another case
like Chick Kam Choo arises, but with a foreign defendant rather
than a domestic defendant, the Court will recognize the implications
of imposing our somewhat bizarre federal structure upon the international community, just as the Court recognized the international
implications of extending jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in
Asahi.
The Court did, however, forge some headway in its other jurisdiction case in the 1987 Term, providing clear guidance both to lower
courts and to practitioners with a black-letter rule. In Omni Capital
Internationalv. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd.,67 the Court held that a
Louisiana federal court had no personal jurisdiction over a British
corporation in a suit alleging an implied private cause of action

66. The Supreme Court of Texas refused to hear oral argument or issue a written opinion
in the largest civil case in American history that raised important issues of both state and
federal law. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Court of Appeals 1977), writ
ref'd n.r.e., 748 S.W.2d 631 (1987). Two lower federal courts had previously concluded that

Texaco raised substantial federal questions in its appeal from the Texas judgment. See Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). The author was a member of Texaco's

litigation team in these cases.
67.

Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
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under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).6 The key point of the
case lies in the now black-letter rule that where there is no express

provision for service of process in a federal statute, personal jurisdiction can be obtained only under a state long-arm statute. 69 A

0
federal court cannot create its own ad hoc service of process rules2

Omni Capital arose out of a commodity futures investment program marketed by two New York corporations, Omni Capital International, Ltd., and Omni Capital Corporation (Omni). Omni allegedly
misrepresented the tax benefits and profits of the program to investors. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed income tax
deductions related to losses in the program, the investors sued Omni.
Omni impleaded Rudolf Wolff & Co., a British corporation, and
James Gourlay, a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom and
employee of Wolff.7 ' The first complaints, filed in 1980 and 1981 in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
alleged violations of the federal securities laws7 2 as well as violations
of state law. After the Supreme Court decided in Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran73 that an implied private
cause of action existed under the CEA,7 4 the complaint was amended

68. Id. at 411. It was conceded before the Court that the requirements of the Louisiana
long-arm statute, which would have provided another basis for personal jurisdiction, were not
met. Id.
69. Id. at 410-11.
70. The Court did not actually hold that a federal court lacks all power to fashion its
own service of process rules. Instead, the Court technically held only that "we would not
fashion a rule for service in this litigation even if we had the power to do so." Id. at 412
But this conclusion followed a rather lengthy list of hurdles that the Court would have to
surmount before deciding it had such a power:
As an initial matter, it is unclear at this time whether it is open to us to fashion a
rule authorizing service of process. At common law, a court lacked authority to
issue process outside its district, and Congress made this same restriction the general
rule when it enacted the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 19. See
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622-623 (1925). Thus, specific
legislative authorization of extraterritorial service of summons was required for a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside the district. Even were
we to conclude that the bases for the rule in Robertson are no longer valid, we
would not necessarily have thd power to create service-of-process rules. We would
have to decide that the provisions of Rules 4(e) and 4(f), in authorizing service in
certain circumstances, were not intended to prohibit service in all other circumstances.
We would also have to find adequate authority for common-law rulemaking.
Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 412.
71. Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
72. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-78kk (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988); SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1987); The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a-77bbbb) (Laiw Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1988). See Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
73. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
74. Commodity Exchange -Act, 42 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-26
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
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to include an action under the CEA. The district court subsequently
dismissed the securities laws claims, holding that they were superceded
75
by passage of the CEA.
The district court initially held that it had jurisdiction over the
British defendants despite the absence of an explicit service of process
provision in the CEA because "Congress intended for United States
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants not
present in the United States to the limits of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. ' 7 6 The district court subsequently reversed
itself after a Fifth Circuit decision held that in the absence of an
explicit service of process provision in a federal statute, process may
be served only in accordance with a state long-arm statute. 7" Since
the requirements of the Louisiana long-arm statute were not met,
the district court dismissed the CEA claims and entered final judgment in favor of the defendants. 78 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
79
dismissal.
The Supreme Court agreed that there was no jurisdiction. The
Court first reaffirmed the principle that service of process is a
neceisary prerequisite to a federal court's assertion of personal jurisdiction.80 Since the defendants did not consent to service, service
could be had only if authorized by law. 8' Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of'Civil Procedure is the fount of a federal court's power to serve
process. Rule 4(e), the relevant provision in Omni Capital, provides
that: "[w]henever a statute of the United States ... provides for
service of a summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or
found within the state in which the district court is held, service may
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by
the statute. '8 2 In the absence of such a federal statute, a federal
district court looks to "a statute ... of the state in which the district
court is held," which in Omni Capital meant the Louisiana long83
arm statute.
Since the CEA did not expressly provide for service of summons,
the first issue for the Court was whether a service of summons
75.
76.

Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 407.
Id. at 407 (quoting App. 9).

77.

Id. at 408. See DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1983)

(discussing Burnstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982)).
78. Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 408.

79.
80.

Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986).
Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 409.

81.
82.
83.

Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. 404 (1988).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. 404 (1988).

1988 / The Supreme Court's 1987-88 Term
provision was somehow implied in the Act. The Court's task here
was made somewhat easier by the passage of the Futures Trading
Act of 1982 which explicitly authorized the private right of action
that Curran had earlier held was implied in the CEA.8 4 The Futures
Trading Act did not explicitly provide for service of process. Faced
with many related and analogous statutes that did contain an express
service of process provision, 5 the absence of such a provision in the
Futures Trading Act was viewed by the Court as a -relatively clear
signal that no such provision was implied . 6 Although the plaintiffs'
argument technically was that service of process should have been
implied for the private cause of action created by Curran (rather
than implied in the Futures Trading Act), the Court, understandably,
held that it would not imply a service of process provision for the
Curran-created cause of action when Congress did not expressly
provide for service of process in its Curran-inspired Futures Trading
Act. 87
Since no service of process provision was implied in the CEA, the
only remaining question was whether a federal court could fill the
gap left in the CEA by creating their own service of process rule.88
The Court rejected that possibility as far as the CEA was concerned
and strongly indicated that it would reject that possibility as a general
rule.8 9 In sum, if a federal statute does not explicitly contain a service
of process provision, then a federal court can assert jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant if, and only if, jurisdiction would be proper
under a state long-arm stdtute.
It is fair to^ ask why Congress might have enacted the Futures
Trading Act of 1982 without including a service of process provision.
The Act, after all, explicitly provided that "[tihe United States district
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of actions brought under this
section. "90 Attempting to explain the gap in the Futures Trading Act,
84. 7 U.S.C.S. § 25 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988).
85. The Court cited the following: For other civil actions under the CEA, 7 U.S.C.S. §§
Ia-1, 13a-2(4) & 18(d) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988); for actions under the federal
securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1988) & 78aa (Law. Co.op.
1983 & Supp. 1988). Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 410-11.
86. Onini Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 410.

87. The Court wrote that "now that Congress has enacted a private cause of action
without nationwide service, we have a better perspective on Congress' view of the role of a
private action within the statute as a whole. We see no reason to take a different position.
Accordingly, we conclude that a nationwide service provision for a private action was not
implicit in the CEA." Id. at 411.
88. Id. at 411-12.
89. Id. at 412-13.
90.

7 U.S.C.S. § 25(c) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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Blackmun quoted the following from the legislative history of the
act: "[tihe availability of ... private rights of action supplements,
but does not substitute, for the regulatory and enforcement program
of the CFTC [Commodity and Futures Trading Commission]....
The Committee fully expects (it will) not become necessary to rely
on private litigants as a policeman of the Commodity Exchange
Act." 9
According to Blackmun, this snippet of legislative history helps to
explain why Congress might have decided to omit a service of process
section. Specifically, since Congress did not intend private rights of
action to be the primary enforcement mechanism, "it is unremarkable
that Congress enacted broader service provisions for CFTC actions
than for private actions." 92
Blackmun's attempt to bolster the Court's conclusion with this
citation to the legislative history is not persuasive. In the first place,
only four paragraphs earlier in the House Committee's Report, the
Committee emphasizes that "the right of an aggrieved person to sue
a violator of the Act is critical to protecting the public and fundamental to maintaining the credibility of the futures market.' ' 9 If the
private right of action is "critical" and "fundamental," then it
makes little sense not to have provided for service of process in the
federal courts that have exclusive jurisdiction of the cause.
Secondly, Justice Blackmun's selective quote omits several important phrases that are important in understanding the House Report.
The full quote is as follows, with the omitted material italicized:
The availability of these remedies-reparations, arbitration and
private rights of action-supplements, but does not substitute, for
the regulatory and enforcement program of the CFTC [Commodity
and Futures Trading Commission] and self-regulatory agencies. The
Committee fully expects that these agencies will vigorously use the
tools at its command to protect the investing public so that it does
not become necessary to rely on private litigants as a policeman of
the Commodity Exchange Act.94
The complete quote makes it clear that in the language relied upon
by Blackmun, the Committee was simply exhorting the Commission
91.

Omni Capital, 108 S. Ct. at 411 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-565, pt. 1, p. 57 (1982),

reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 3871, 3906).
92. Omni Capital, 108 S.Ct. at 411.
93. H.R. Rep. No. 97-565, pt. 1, p. 56-57, reprintedin 1982 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & ADMIN.

NEws 3871, 3905-06 (emphasis added).

94. H.R. Rep. No. 97-565, pt. 1, p. 57, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEws. 3871, 3906.
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not to lose sight of its responsibilities; the Committee was not
suggesting that it viewed the private cause of action as somehow
deserving less respect. Moreover the remedy, "reparations," which
was listed along with "private rights of action," contained an explicit
service of process provision. Thus, Blackmun's conclusion that the
paragraph somehow demonstrates why Congress might have omitted
a service of process provision for the private right of action makes
little sense.
Blackmun's selective and very heavily edited quote from the legislative history is the only thing that mars the Court's opinion. The
Court would have been more direct if it had admitted simply that
the gap in the Futures Trading Act may have been inadvertent and
that it was for Congress, and not the Court, to resolve.
III.

COMimRCIA_

AND Busn-ss LAW

The most important business law case in the last Term involved
the legality of gray market goods. In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,9S
the Court narrowly upheld all but one of the regulations enacted by
the Customs Service which had permitted the proliferation of gray
96
market goods in the United States.
As described by the Court, "[a] gray-market good is a foreignmanufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is
imported without the consent of the U.S. trademark holder." 97 There
is a market in such goods because "authorized distributors often
charge U.S. retailers more for the goods than they charge retailers
in other countries." 98 The foreign retailers in turn distribute the
goods in the United States at prices below what the authorized
retailers can charge. 99 The question presented in K Mart was whether

95. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108'S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
96. Although there are no reliable government statistics on the size of the gray market,
it was described by Justice Brennan as a "multibillion-dollar industry." 108 S. Ct. at 1819
(Brennan, J., concurring). The New York Times reported that "[m]ost estimates put it at
below SIO billion a year in total sales." The N.Y: Times, June 1, 1988, at C6, col. 3.
For a pre-K Mart discussion of gray market issues, see Note, OriginalAppalachianArtworks,
Inc. v. GranadaElectronics, Inc.: The Cabbage Patch Doll Goes Gray? 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
339 (1988).
97. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1814.
98. Wall St. J., June 1, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
99. "Steven Kurzman, a lawyer who represented a coalition of retailers and gray-market
importers in the case, said gray-market goods typically sell in the U.S. for 25% to 40% less
than imports handled through authorized distribution channels. The items include cameras,
watches, fragrances, cosmetics, electronic goods, liquor and tires made overseas." Wall St. J.,
June 1, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
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Customs Service regulations that legalized the gray market practice
in certain circumstances were valid.
The starting point for analysis of the issue is Section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1922 (later reenacted as Section 526 of the Tariff Act
of 1930) which provides, in relevant part:
... it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the
label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark
owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created
or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States
... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.w0
A superficial reading of this statute would indicate that, unless
written consent of the trademark owner is provided, it prohibits the
importation into the United. States of all products manufactured
outside of the United States which bear a United States trademark
that is owned by a United States citizen or corporation and is
registered by a United States domiciliary. This common sense reading
would effectively outlaw the gray market in the United States. The
common sense reading is not, however, the reading given to the
Statute by the Customs Service. Customs Service regulations have
for fifty years interpreted the statute to permit certain gray market
goods to enter without the written consent of the trademark owner.
In the "prototypical" gray market case, a U.S. firm purchases
from an independent foreign manufacturer the right to distribute the
manufacturer's products and the right to register and use the manufacturer's trademarks.10' The statute clearly bars importation of
those products without the U.S. company's written approval, and
Customs Service regulations provide no exception in this circumstance. All members of the Court agreed with this interpretation of
the statute. 0 2
However, the Customs Service exceptions in K Mart did not involve
such a prototypical case. Rather, they involved products manufactured and distributed by companies that were related either by
corporate structure or by agreement:
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions ... do not apply
to imported articles when:

100. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
101. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1814-15.
102. Id. at 1818.
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(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are
owned by the same person or business entity;

(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary comparmes or are otherwise suibject to common
ownership or control; [or]
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a iecorded trademark
or trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner .... 103
The first two exceptions are referred tb jointly as the "commoncontrol" exception, and the third is referred to as the "authorizeduse" exception.1,4
Because of the deference that the Supreme Court gives to agency
interpretations of a statute, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Customs Service's interpretation (as expressed in the
regulations) was "in conflict with the plain language of the statute."'0 5 Only if a statute is "clear and unambiguous" will the
Supreme Court refuse to defer to an agency's interpretation. 106 According to Justice Kennedy0 7 "[f]n ascertaining the plain meaning of
the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language
at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a
whole."' 0
The common-control exception applies to three different types of
corporate manufacturing and distribution schemes: (a) a foreign
manufacturer-parent and a wholly owned United States distribution
subsidiary which registers a trademark identical to the foreign parent's
trademark; (b) a United States parent which registers and owns the
trademark and a wholly owned foreign manufacturing subsidiary;
and (c) a United States company which registers and owns the
trademark and a foreign unincorporated manufacturing division. 1' 9
All members of the Court agreed that the language of the statute
was sufficiently ambiguous so that the Customs Service could provide
an exception (and allow gray market goods to enter the U.S.) for
scheme (a) above, involving a foreign manufacturing parent and

103. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1987).
104. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1816.
105. Id. at 1817.

106. Id.
107.

Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote in the case and his opinion is therefore of

critical importance.
108. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Kennedy cited as primary support for this
proposition Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255 (1988), which was Justice
Kennedy's first opinion as an Associate Justice and is a paradigm of how Justice Kennedy
approaches issues of statutory construction. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817.
109. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1815.
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wholly owned United States distribution subsidiary." 0 The ambiguity
was contained in the italicized language of the statute: "it shall be
unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture... bear[ing] a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by
a corporation or association created or organized within, the United
States ... ."I"The ambiguity arises because a trademark owned by
a U.S. company that is wholly owned by a foreign manufacturing
company may be said to be actually owned by the foreign company."1
Justices Kennedy, White, and Brennan," 3 also believed that the
statute was ambiguous with respect to schemes (b) and (c) above,
which involve a U.S. parent and a foreign manufacturing firm that
is either a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. parent or a division
of the parent. According to Justice Kennedy, the statutory language,
"merchandise of foreign manufacture," is ambiguous in much the
same way that the phrase "owned by" is ambiguous."14 Thus, the
phrase might well mean "goods manufactured in a foreign country
by a foreign company.""15 Since the foreign manufacturer in schemes
(b) and (e) is wholly owned and controlled by a U.S. company (and
not a foreign company), the statute arguably would not apply, and
gray market competition would be permitted.
With respect to the authorized-use exception, the Court (by a
different majority of justices)" 6 held that no ambiguity in the statute
existed which would justify the Customs Service regulation." 7 Accordingly, that regulation (which was severable from the others) was
struck down," 8 and a United States company that authorizes a
foreign, independent manufacturer to use the United States trademark
for foreign distribution may now finally prevent gray market competition in the United States.

110. Id. at 1818.
111. Id., citing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
112. 108 S. Ct. at 1818; 108 S. Ct. at 1821 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); 108 S. Ct. at- 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Justice White joined in all of Justice Kennedy's opinion with one exception. Justice
Brennan wrote separately for himself and Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 1819 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 1818.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Kennedy, Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 1818-19 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White dissented from this portion of
Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 1819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. 108 S. Ct. at 1818-19; 108 S. Ct. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
118. Id. at 1819.
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The two other opinions by Justices Brennan and Scalia, both of
which concurred in part and dissented in part, speak volumes about
the different approaches each Justice takes to statutory interpretation
and decision-making. Justice Kennedy limited his opinion to a discussion of the text of the statute and regulation. By contrast, Justice
Brennan's opinion goes far beyond the language of the statute to
divine, using "traditional tools of statutory construction," the "congressional intent."11 9 Brennan justified this approach by quoting
20
language originally from Holy Trinity Church v. United States,'
that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
not within its spirit, nor within the
within the statute, because
2
intention of its makers.' '
In Brennan's view, the Statute was the result of protectionist forces
that, more than anything else, hoped "to reserve exclusively to
domestic, not foreign, interests the extraordinary protection that §
526 provides."'' With this congressional intent identified, and with
an approach to statutory interpretation that permitted a court to
reach results consistent with that intent even against "the letter of
the statute,"'' Brennan was of the view that even the authorizeduse exception was permissible. According to Brennan, authorized-use
(i.e., trademark licensing) did not generally exist when the Tariff Act
of 1922 was enacted.12 For Brennan, then, it made no sense to ask
whether the authorized-use exception, which was first enacted in
1972,121 was consistent with or inconsistent with the statute. Instead,
Brennan believed the authorized-use exception was valid because:
Any prescient legislator who could have contemplated that a trademark ownier might license the use of its trademark would almost
certainly have concluded that such a transaction would divest the
licensor not only of the benefit of § 526's importation prohibition,
but of all trademark protection; and anyone who gave thought to
the possibility that a trademark holder might assign rights to use
its trademark, along with business and goodwill, to an unrelated
manufacturer in another territory had good reason to expect the
26
same result.
119.
120.
121.
(1979))
122.
part).
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1982).
K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1821-22 (quoting Sheetworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201
(emphasis added).
K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 1821-22 (quoting Sheetworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)).
K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1829.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1972).
K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan thus thought it proper when faced with a situation
not contemplated by the drafters of a statute to try to fill that gap
based upon a perceived purpose behind the statute,27 even if the gap
was not apparent on the face of the statute itself.1
Justice Scalia dissented from that portion of Kennedy's opinion
upholding the common-control exception as it applied to a U.S.
parent and foreign manufacturing subsidiary or division. In Scalia's
view, the phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture" was not
ambiguous and could possibly mean only "manufactured in a foreign
country," as opposed to "manufactured by a foreign manufacturer
in a foreign country.'1 2 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia
relied upon, among other things, the Government's petition for writ
of certiorari, correspondence between the Customs Service and a
United States Senator, and prior versions of the regulations. 2 9 Kennedy answered Scalia's challenge in the following passage:
First, the threshold question in ascertaining the correct interpretation
of a statute is whether the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous.
The purported gloss any party gives to the statute, or any reference
to legislative history, is in the first instance irrelevant. Further, I

127. Id. at 1830-31.
128. Id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 1832-33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia's basic
point was that in the prior agency correspondence and prior versions of the regulation,
reference was made explicitly to "articles produced and sold abroad" and "merchandise
manufactured or sold in a foreign country." Id. (quoting 1951 correspondence from the
Commissioner of Customs to Senator Douglas and prior versions of the regulation). Scalia
argued that the agency therefore had interpreted the phrase "of foreign manufacture" to mean
"manufactured in a foreign country." Id. at 1831-32.
The difficulty with Scalia's position is that the prior versions of the regulation would seem
naturally to have allowed gray market competition in circumstances where Scalia argued gray
market competition should have been denied. Thus, the'common-control exception in the prior
version of the regulation provided that gray market imports were allowed when "merchandise
manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a trade-mark or trade name, which trademark is registered and recorded, or which trade name is recorded under [U.S. law], shall not
[be barred] if such foreign trade-mark or trade name and such United States trade-mark or
trade name are owned by the same person, partnership, association, or corporation." 19
C.F.R. § 11.14(b) (1969) (emphasis added). In a case involving a U.S. company that establishes
a foreign manufacturing subsidiary (which was the case about which Kennedy and Scalia
disagreed), the foreign sales of the product fall within the express language of the prior
regulation. Moreover, there is no evidence at all that the agency intended to change the result
in this case when it amended the section in the early 1970s. 35 Fed. Reg. 19,629 (Dec. 17,
1970).
Perhaps the real reason for Scalia's dissent is his concern that our trading partners will not
"look favorably upon a regulation which, as now interpreted, treats goods manufactured by
American companies on their soil more favorably than goods manufactured there by their
own nationals." Id. 108 S. Ct. at 1833 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Yet as Justice Brennan's opinion correctly observes, both the statute and regulation were
designed overtly to be protectionist and to favor U.S. companies. Id. at 1826-27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decline to assign any binding or authoritative effect to the particular
verbiage Justice Scalia highlights. The quoted phrases are simply

the Government's explanation of the practical effect the current
regulation has in applying the statute, and come from the statement
of the case portion of its petition for a writ of certiorari. 130
The three opinions in K Mart thus give us a good picture of three
different approaches to statutory interpretation: (a) Kennedy subscribes to a stiong version of the plain-meaning rule in which
legislative history is not relevant (at least "in the first instance"); (b)
Brennan (joined by Marshall, Stevens and probably White) uses the
plain meaning as a starting point for analysis, but will usually resort
to extinsic materials in a search for congressional intent; and (c)
Scalia (joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun and O'Connor) begins with
the plain meaning, but, if the plain meaning is contrary to the
interpretation offered by the government's lawyers or by the agency,
will attach significant weight to that interpretation, even if it is
3
contrary to the plain meaning.' '
Although the decision in K Mart lays to rest a challenge to the
regulations based on the language of the statute, the statute and
regulations may still be challenged as being in conflict with various
treaty obligations. Justice Scalia correctly observed that the interpretation of the statute adopted by the Court might conflict with
commercial treaties according national treatment and most-favorednation treatment to foreign manufacturers. 3 2 There is certainly no
doubt that the statute as interpreted is protectionist in its discriminatory treatment. Whether that discrimination violates any treaty
obligations is an open issue.
IV.

IMMIGRATION AND NiXTURALIZATION

The Court had two immigration and naturalization cases in the
1987-88 Term. In the first case, Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Abudu, 3 the Court considered whether it should review
under an abuse of discretion standard a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) to refuse to reopen a deportation proceeding on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The BIA refused
130.
131.

108 S. Ct. at 1818 n.4 (emphasis added).
On different approaches to statutory interpretation, see R.R. Kelso and C.K. Kelso,

Appeals in Federal Courts by Prosecuting Entities Other Than the United States; The Plain
Meaning Rule Revisited, 33 HAstiNcs L.J. 187 (1981).
132. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1833 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988).
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to reopen the proceedings because the applicant failed to explain why
the newly discovered evidence could not have been introduced earlier.
The Court held, in accord with prior analogous cases, that the abuse
of discretion standard applied. '4
Abudu, a citizen of Ghana, first entered the United States in 1965
on a student visa. He subsequently became a licensed physician and
married an American citizen. Abudu's student visa authorized him
to remain in the United States only until 1976, but Abudu overstayed
his visa. Deportation proceedings were initiated following Abudu's
criminal conviction of attempting to obtain narcotics by fraud. Abudu
designated England as the country of deportation and expressly
refused to seek asylum as a refugee. He was ordered deported on
July 1, 1982.135
On February 1, 1985, while his appeal from the deportation order
was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Abudu asked
the BIA to reopen his deportation proceeding to consider his request
for asylum. In that motion, Abudu "claimed that he had a wellfounded fear that if England did not accept him and he was returned
to Ghana, his life and freedom would be threatened by the regime
' 36
in power.'
The BIA denied the motion to reopen on two grounds. First, it
held that virtually all of the facts alleged in the motion to reopen
were available to Abudu at the time of his deportation hearing in
1981-82 and that Abudu had therefore failed to reasonably explain
his failure to request asylum at that time. 37 Second, it held that, in
134. Id. at 907.
135. Id. Abudu argued in the deportation hearing that by marrying an American citizen,
he was eligible for an adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1255(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
This argument was rejected because the drug conviction was, under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(23)

(Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1988), a nonwaivable ground for exclusion. Abudu, 108 S. Ct.
at 907 n.I.
136. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. at 908.
137. BIA regulations provide that a deportation hearing will not be reopened unless "it
appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and

could not have been'discovered or presented at the former hearing," 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987),
and unless the alien has "reasonably explain[ed] the failure to request asylum prior to the
completion of the exclusion or deportation proceeding." 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1987).
Abudu's fear of persecution in Ghana was based primarily on the change in 1981 of the
government in power in Ghana. The new government allegedly "had carried out a systematic
campaign of persecution against its political enemies," which included Abudu's "brother and

certain close friends." Abudu, 108 S.Ct. at 908. Since the deportation proceeding had been
open until July of 1982, however, the 1981 change in government was not a newly discovered
fact.

The only new evidence that Abudu offered was a surprise visit in 1984 by a former longtime friend who had become a high government official in Ghana. The visitor invited Abudu,
who was by then a qualified physician, to return to Ghana. The BIA held that this evidence
was not probative since the visitor "in fact may have been paying a purely social visit." Id.
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the absence of more specific allegations and affidavits, "his conjectures about probable threats were too speculative to constitute a
prima facie showing of eligibility for either asylum or withholding
of deportation."'138
The Ninth Circuit held, focusing entirely upon the BIA conclusion
that no prima facie case had been stated, that it would review the
BIA decision under the same standard used to review summary
judgment motions in federal court. 39 The Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding, first, that the Ninth Circuit
had improperly focused all of its attention on the prima facie case
ground for denial, and had ignored the BIA conclusion that Abudu
did not reasonably explain his failure to assert his claim in the 198182 proceeding. 40 The Court further held that the BIA conclusion
must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 14' The Court
analogized a motion to reopen to "a motion for a new trial in a
criminal case on the basis of newly discovered evidence, as to which
courts have uniformly held that the moving party bears a heavy
burden."' 42 The Court expressly refused to decide what standard of
review should apply to a BIA determination
that no prima facie case
43
had been stated in an application.
Abudu is the most recent in a long line of Supreme Court decisions
that treat deportation decisions by the BIA as unique administrative
determinations. According to the Court, since Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials must be especially sensitive to
political functions that involve questions of foreign relations, the
reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on petitions for
reopening or reconsideration in other administrative proceedings apply with even greater force in INS proceedings.'"
In the second immigration case heard during the 1987-88 Term,
Kungys v. United States,145 the Court attempted to clarify the standards used in certain denaturalization proceedings. Kungys was granted
a visa in 1948 and became a naturalized citizen in 1954. In 1982, the

138. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. at 909.
139. Id. Under that standard, the BIA should have drawn all reasonable inferences from
the complaint in favor of Abudu, and a reasonable inference from the 1984 visit was that
Abudu would be subject to persecution in Ghana. Id. at 910.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 911.
Id. at 912-13.
Id. at 914.

143. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. at 911.
144.

Id. at 914-15.

145.

Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988).
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Department of Justice began denaturalization proceedings against
Kungys, alleging three grounds for an order of deportation: 46 (a)
That in 1941 Kungys had participated in executing over 2,000 Lithuanians in Kedainiai, Lithuania; (b) That in applying for his visa
and in the naturalization proceedings, Kungys made false statements
about the date and place of his birth, wartime occupations, and
wartime residence; 147 (c) That the false statements demonstrated that
Kungys lacked the good moral character required of applicants for
48
citizenship status.
The district court found against the government on all three
grounds. 49 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part. It found in favor of the government on the second ground,
and against the government on the third ground. Having found in
the government's favor on the second ground, the court did not
consider whether there was any error in the district court's consideration of the first ground.'-t Therefore, when the case came before
the Supreme Court, the only possible grounds for denaturalization
were material misrepresentations or concealments and lack of good
moral character. The underlying facts for both grounds concerned
Kungys' statements about his place and date of birth and his residence
and occupation during the war.
The first problem for the Court was to agree upon a standard for
what constitutes a "material fact" under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). In an
earlier case, Chaunt v. United States, 5' the Court apparently had
held that the government's burden under Section 1451(a) was "to
show by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1)that
facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial
of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in
an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts
warranting denial of citizenship."152

146. Id. at 1543-44.
147. 8. U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982) provides that an order granting citizenship may be revoked
if "such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Id.
148. 8. U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982) provides that an applicant for citizenship be "a person of

good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States." Id.
149. Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1544.
150. Id.

151.
152.

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
Id. at 355 (quoted in Kungys v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 1545 (1988)).
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Lower courts struggled for almost thirty years to interpret and
apply this language, with little consistency.1 3 In Kungys, the Court
abandoned the language from Chaunt, describing it merely as
"dicta."' 4 In its place, a majority of the Court adopted the following
formulation for "material": "a concealment or misrepresentation is
material if it 'has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of
influencing, the decision of' the decision-making body to which it
was addressed.''155

Applying tlis general test to the specific context of a denaturalization proceeding before the INS, the majority held that "the test
of whether Kungys' concealments or misrepresentations were material
is whether they had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of
56
the INS."'
The third ground for denaturalization was that Kungys lacked good
moral character. According to 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(f)(6), a person is
deemed not to be bf good moral character if he "has given false
testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this
chapter."'1. The same majority of the Court held that any false
testimony, even immaterial false testinony, satisfies section
1101(f)(6).

58

Although this may seem a rather extreme interpretation,

the Court justified it by highlighting two limitations on section
liOl(f)(6):
First, 'testimonyi' is limited to oral statements made under oath.
The United States concedes that it does not include 'other types of
misrepresentations or concealments, such as falsified documents or
statements not made under oath.' [citations omitted] Second, - §
1101(f)(6) applies. to only those misrepresentations made with the
subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.' 9

The Court then remanded for consideration of two further issues:
(a) whether'Kungys' misrepresentations constituted "testimony"; and

153.

Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1545 (citing cases). The Court's one attempt to forge a consistent

interpretation of Chaunt in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S: 490 (1981), was unsuccessful.
Kungys, 108 S.Ct. at 1545.
154. Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1545.
155. Id. at 1546 (noting, e.g., Weinstock v. United States, 97 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 36768, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02; United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987)).

156. Kungys, 108 S.Ct. at 1547. In defending this test against the seemingly more specific
language from Chaunt, the Court noted that "[though this formulation may seem less verbally
precise than Chaunt, in application it may well produce greater uniformity, since judges are
accustomed to using it, and can consult a large body of case precedent." Id.
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(6) (1987).
158. Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1537.
159. Id. at 1551.
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(b) whether Kungys had the requisite subjective intent.16°
Although it may seem that the Court settled and clarified many
important issues, lower courts are likely to find that Kungys, like
Chaunt and Fedorenko, is subject to varying interpretations. The
most serious problem is that although a majority of the Court agreed
upon a formulation for the materiality requirement, a majority could
not agree upon how to apply that test to the facts. Justice White,
who provided the fifth vote for the majority, dissented from the
result reached in the case. 161 The critical difference between Justice
White and the plurality was that White would allow the INS to
attach significance to the fact that Kungys made a misrepresentation:
I would ask not only whether these misrepresentations of fact would
have a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS, but
also whether the fact of these misrepresentations itself would have
had such a tendency. In other words, the proper inquiry is not only
whether the true date and place of birth, in isolation, would have
aroused suspicion, but whether an investigation would have ensued
had petitioner revealed the true facts and thereby disclosed the
discrepancy between them and the false statements in his supporting
documents. 62
The plurality disagreed, however, and indicated that the only
appropriate question was whether the actual date and place of birth
would have led to the discovery of other facts relevant to Kungys'
status.'63 In the plurality's view, "what is relevant is what would
have ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact (in
this case, Kungys' true date and place of birth), not what would
have ensued from official knowledge of inconsistency between a
posited assertion of the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood."164
To further confuse matters, there were two separate concurring
opinions in Kungys. Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun) believed that the materiality requirement meant that "in
the denaturalization context, the only statements that are capable of
influencing the outcome are those that conceal disqualifying facts or
that prevent or hinder the discovery of disqualifying facts." '' 65
For Stevens, the ultimate question was whether there existed any
disqualifying facts that would have been revealed but for the mis-

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1562, 1563 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1566 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1548.
Id. at 1549.

165.

Id. at 1555 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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representation. 6 The plurality rejected this view, however, because
according to Justice Stevens' concurrence, citizenship obtained by
deceit may be revoked, but only for a reason other than deceit.' 6 7 In
the plurality's view, once a material misrepresentation has been
shown, a presumption arises that the true facts, if known, would
have disqualified the applicant for citizenship. The presumption is
rebuttable on a showing by the naturalized citizen that the statutory
requirement as to which the misrepresentation had a naturaltendency
to produce a favorable decision, was in fact met. 68
The second concurrence, by Justice Brennan, further confuses
matters. According to Brennan,-the presumption of ineligibility arises
only if the Government can produce evidence sufficient to raise a
fair inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed. A
mere possibility that a disqualifying fact might have existed should
not entitle the Government to the benefit of a presumption of
69
ineligibility.
Given the several opinions by the Court, it is fair to question
whether the law has been clarified or confused by Kungys. This
writer's view is that the Court has taken a bad situation and made
it worse. Although it apparently resolved the proper formulation of
the materiality requirement, Kungys leaves lower courts with no
guidance whatsoever on how to apply that requirement. The result,
no doubt, will be continuing confusion as lower courts struggle to
interpret the actions of a badly fractured Court.

166. Applying that standard to the second and third grounds for denaturalization, Stevens
would have found against the government on both. Id. at 1554 (Stevens, J., concurring). He

would have remanded the case to the court of appeals for its initial consideration of the first
ground for denaturalization (i.e., participation in the execution of over 2,000 Lithuanians).
Id. at 1562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 1550.
168. Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1550 (emphasis in original). In reaching this conclusion, the
plurality relied both upon the materiality requirement and the independent requirement that
the citizenship be "procured by" the misrepresentation. Id. See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(a) (Lav
Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1988) (power to institute proceedings to cancel certificate of naturalization
procured illegally or by concealment or misrepresentation).
169. Kungys, 108 S. Ct. at 1553 (Brennan, 3., concurring) (emphasis added).
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